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The post-Suharto transformation of civil-military relations in Indonesia marked the 
end of its first decade in 2008. During the past ten years of developing democracy, 
political leaders and some military officers have worked to reduce the military's 
political influence and to rein in military adventurism. Under the banner of political 
reform, or reformasi, the military's return to the barracks constituted a top national 
agenda for civilian political leaders who faced the twin task of eliminating the legacy of 
Suharto's authoritarian regime and constructing a political system based on democratic 
principles. Suharto's death in February 2008 provided an opportunity for the media to 
reflect on the ten years since his ouster, stimulating a debate on the achievements of 
reformasi. Recognizing the symbolic nature of the tenth anniversary, President Susilo 
Bambang Yuhoyono, in his speech on Armed Forces Day in 2007, ordered the military 
to produce a report evaluating the first decade of military reforms.* 1
During this decade, scholarship about the Indonesian military has examined the 
development of military reforms aimed at democratizing civil-military relations. The 
discourse almost exclusively focuses on the role of the army, because army generals 
were the most politically influential and active during the thirty-two years of Suharto's 
presidency and the army is the largest of the armed services. While this focus is
* I am grateful to Professor Jeff Kingston, Temple University, Japan Campus; Professor and Vice President 
Takashi Shiraishi, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (Japan); and the editors of Indonesia for 
their invaluable comments and criticism.
1 See "Amanat Presiden RI pada Acara Peringatan HUT ke-62 TNI," October 5, 2007. See, for example: 
http: / / www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1038&Itemid=26
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understandable given the institutional importance of the army, reform has also 
affected the navy and air force. How have these service branches been affected by the 
end of the Suharto era and the subsequent wave of reformasi? How have they 
influenced civil-military politics regarding military reform and security sector 
governance? Since the army is not the sole component of the military, these questions 
merit investigation to enrich our understanding of evolving Indonesian civil-military 
relations in the age of democracy.
This essay examines the post-Suharto adaptation of the navy, the institution long 
responsible for the archipelago's maritime security. What follows is an analysis of how 
the pressures facing the navy differed from those facing the army, how those pressures 
generated reform incentives for the navy, and how the navy has adapted itself to the 
changing circumstances. The military response to democratic transformation is not 
monolithic, as each service has its own agenda, and the case of the navy illustrates the 
shrewd instrumentalizing of "global" agendas, e.g., international cooperation for a 
better maritime governance, in order to preserve vested institutional interests vis-a-vis 
competitors in the age of reformasi.
Militarization of Maritime Governance during the Suharto Era
The navy is traditionally the second largest force in the armed forces of Indonesia 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), with about 57,000 personnel, and is only one- 
fifth the size of the army.2 This small navy (Angkatan Laut, or TNI-AL) is tasked with 
maritime security covering 5.8 million square kilometers—including territorial waters 
of almost a million square kilometers, a contiguous maritime zone of 2.3 million square 
kilometres, and an EEZ (exclusive economic zone) of 2.7 million square kilometers. 
Since independence, defense planners have been concerned about the navy's capacity 
effectively to provide maritime security for this sprawling archipelago. Despite such 
professional concerns, budgetary constraints have delayed significantly the pace of 
naval modernization. Moreover, the Cold War environment—which encouraged the 
formation of an anti-communist block in Southeast Asia—helped the Suharto 
administration to concentrate more on domestic security than external defense issues 
that would require more spending to build up the navy's capacity. In lieu of sufficient 
budget allocations to bolster the navy's capacity, the government accorded it a large 
measure of autonomy in carrying out its maritime security mission. This unmonitored 
autonomy provided the navy with the flexibility and incentive to engage in self­
financing to supplement its budget, especially through business activities, both legal 
and illegal.3
2 This official account, mentioned in the Defense White Book, dates from 2003. See Departmen Pertahanan, 
Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21 (Jakarta: Dephan, 2003), p. 76. The army numbers about 
265,000 soldiers.
3 Like other services, the navy established its own foundation and corporations, and both controlled 
various enterprises involving shipping, resorts, oil refineries, real estate, cocoa plantations, maritime 
electronics and telecommunications, transportation, fisheries, construction, and timber. For details, see 
Danang Widoyoko, et al., Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimasi (Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and 
National Democratic Institute, 2003, p. 120. The navy's involvement in illegal business is typified by its 
protection of smuggling rings, most notoriously in the case of illegal logging. See, for example, a report
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War and the Navy
The genesis of the Indonesian navy can be traced back to 1945, when Sukarno 
proclaimed independence on August 17, and, on August 22, created the People's 
Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, BKR), which included naval units (i.e., BKR- 
AL). Soon after this, on October 5, 1945, Sukarno, who intended to develop existing 
guerrilla organizations into a modern military institution, reorganized the BKR into the 
People's Security Military (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR).4 At this time, the naval 
force, TKR-AL, was established with four divisions: Division 1 in West Java, Division 2 
in Central Java, Division 3 in East Java, and Division 4 in Kalimantan.5 As in the army, 
these naval forces were staffed mainly by voluntary youth organizations, pemuda, 
which established militia groups, or laskar.6 In an attempt to consolidate the identity of 
a unified, national armed forces operating under the president as the supreme 
commander, Sukarno decreed the renaming of TKR to TRI (Tentara Republik 
Indonesia, or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in January 1946, with the 
navy given the new name of ALRI (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia). ALRI 
established its headquarters in Jogjakarta and set up twelve command bases— 
Pangkalan I to XII.7 This was the embryo of today's navy, which maintained the ALRI 
name for more than twenty years until it was renamed TNI-AL in 1970, under the 
Suharto government.
During the independence war, naval operations were ad hoc; they were designed 
to maintain security around ports and naval facilities but also played a role in the land- 
based guerrilla campaign.8 Soon after independence, the government faced the task of 
establishing peacetime maritime rules. Replacing Dutch regulations related to 
maritime affairs, the post-independence government issued an ordinance in 1949 that 
identified government agencies involved in maritime management.9 These agencies 
included the navy (ALRI), the water police (Polisi Air, Polair), customs, the 
Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Directorate of Sea 
Communication in the Department of Transportation. All of them operated vessels 
used for their respective functions, but a lack of financial and human resources 
discouraged their functional specialization, resulting in a confusing overlapping of 
roles among the maritime agencies. Inevitably, maritime management in the early 
years of independence was chaotic, as competition among stakeholders encouraged a
published by an international NGO, Environmental Investigation Agency / Telapak, "The Last Frontier: 
Illegal Logging in Papua and China's Massive Timber Theft," EIA/ Telapak, February 2005.
4 Today, October 5 is celebrated as Armed Forces Day.
5 For information on the responsibility of each division, see Direktorat Perawatan Personil TNI-AL, 
Beberapa Tradisi di Lingkungan TNI-AL (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah TNI-AL, 1989), pp. 46-47.
6 About the role of pemuda and laskar in the building of the national military, see Ulf Sundhaussen, The 
Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 23-26.
7 They were, namely, Pangkalan 1/ ALRI Serang; Pangkalan II/ALRI Krawang; Pangkalan III/ ALRI 
Cirebon; Pangkalan IV/ ALRI Tegal; Pangkalan V/ ALRI Pemalang; Pangkalan VI/ ALRI Djuana; 
Pangkalan VII/ ALRI Lawang; Pangkalan VIII/ ALRI Madura; Pangkalan IX/ ALRI Probolinggo; 
Pangkalan X / ALRI Banjuwangi; Pangkalan XI/ ALRI Pacitan; and Pangkalan XII/ ALRI Cilacap.
8 See Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces o f Indonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 95.
9 The ordinance is Ordonansi No. 113 Lembaran Negara 1949.
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"go your own way" mentality and undermined efforts to coordinate missions and 
visions.
The confusion of peacetime maritime governance was soon overcome by the navy, 
which succeeded in militarizing maritime administration while the government was 
suppressing a series of rebellions in the outer islands and consolidating central 
government authority over disputed territories. In this process, the navy established its 
dominance vis-a-vis other maritime agencies, and it was accomplished via the 
following three steps. First, in the mid-1950s, the military suppressed the RMS 
(Republik Maluku Selatan, or Republic of South Moluccas) revolt, in which a group of 
Ambonese rejected Indonesian independence.10 Second, in 1958, another anti-separatist 
campaign by the military targeted the PRRI/Permesta (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta, or Revolutionary Government of 
Republic of Indonesia/People's Total Struggle) rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi, 
where the US-supported rebels—involving local military warlords—challenged 
Sukarno's central government.11 The civil war lasted for three years until government 
military forces prevailed. Third, in 1962, the military launched a West Irian "liberation" 
campaign that was coordinated by Brig. Gen. Suharto's Mandala command. This 
campaign encouraged diplomatic negotiations in favor of the territory's incorporation 
of Indonesia, which was finalized in 1963.12
In the scholarship on Indonesia's civil-military relations, those military campaigns 
in the 1950s and 1960s are generally discussed in the context of the army's growing 
influence in national politics. However, the navy also gained significant advantage in 
its sphere of maritime administration. The navy participated in these military 
campaigns by providing logistical support to the army. This provided the navy 
leadership an opportunity to legitimize the ascendancy of the navy over other 
peacetime-oriented maritime agencies in dealing with war logistics and information 
control. The navy had seen the ordinance of 1949—and the consequent overlapping of 
authority among maritime agencies—as an obstacle to gaining power, but in time it 
successfully exploited its wartime authority to dominate maritime administration in 
the territorial waters. In so doing it undermined the role and authority of the water 
police, customs, and the Department of Transportation, which controlled the Coast and 
Ocean Guarding Unit (Kesatuan Penjagaan Laut dan Pantai, KPLP). Invoking the 
threat of national disintegration, the navy advanced its campaign to militarize 
maritime governance, an agenda that it mostly achieved by 1963.
Dwifungsi, UNCLOS, and Operasi Kamla
The consolidation of navy authority over maritime administration and security 
gained further momentum under Suharto's New Order regime. In the early stages of
10 About the RMS's separatist movement, see Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The 
Ambonese Islands from  Colonialism to Revolt 1880-1950 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990).
11 On the rebellion, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret 
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York, NY: The New Press, 1995); and Barbara S. Harvey, 
Permesta: H aifa Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1977).
12 John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover o f  West Papua, 1962-1969: The Anatomy o f  
Betrayal (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
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authoritarian regime-building, Suharto's military institutionalized the practice of dual 
function, or dwifungsi, sending men in uniform to nonmilitary posts in the bureaucracy 
and parliaments, both national and local.13 Since dwifungsi, symbolizing military 
repression of regime opposition, mainly involved the army, the largest and most 
politically influential force within the military, dwifungsi involving the navy has largely 
been overlooked. For the navy, taking part in dwifungsi helped maintain its 
institutional domination of maritime governance via seconding navy officers to high- 
ranking posts in civilian agencies related to maritime matters. The navy personnel 
dispatched to nonmilitary posts could act as the navy's eyes and ears and ensure its 
influence over matters of concern. This arrangement proved valuable and became 
widespread; by 1977, in fact, the navy sent 926 officers to such posts.14 With its officers 
so well placed, the navy was able to fix its authority over all maritime-related agencies. 
Along with this penetration, in 1972 the New Order military established a body, 
Bakorkamla (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut, or the Maritime Security 
Coordinating Body), to coordinate the policies and activities of maritime-related 
agencies under the direct control of the military commander-in-chief. Bakorkamla 
served to sustain the militarization of peacetime maritime administration. In fact, the 
regional divisions of Bakorkamla were chaired by the navy's Eastern and Western fleet 
commanders.
Another important development that buttressed the navy's role occurred in 1982 
when the military formalized dwifungsi by passing the national defense and security 
law.15 The law provided a legal basis for the navy to consolidate its authority in 
maritime law enforcement, as part of its security activities. This arrangement helped 
the navy to subordinate the police—a component of the four-services New Order 
military that controlled the water police—and the Department of Transportation, 
which supervised KPLP in the field of maritime security. Moreover, the law legalized 
the military doctrine of Hankamneg (pertahanan dan keamanan negara, or national 
defense and security), which mandated military professionalism in the management of 
internal security.16 The navy, in adapting itself to the new law, developed the concept 
of Hankamneg di Laut (Hankamneg at Sea) and started to conduct routine maritime 
policing under the flag of Operasi Keamanan Laut (Kamla), or Maritime Security 
Operations.
Operasi Kamla of the navy gained further sanction in 1985 when Indonesia ratified 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ratification provided 
Indonesia with a right and responsibility to ensure the security and safety of its 
territorial waters and EEZs. The navy used this opportunity to further expand its role 
in law enforcement at sea. This development was favorable to the Suharto government,
13 About dwifungsi and military intervention in politics during the early period of Suharto regime see, for 
example, David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).
14 Nugroho Notosusanto, ed., Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi AllRI (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), p. 379.
15 The law is UU No. 20 Tahun 1982 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Pertahanan dan Keamanan 
Negara RI.
16 About Hankamneg and military professionalism, see Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in 
Indonesia (London and New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), chapter 2.
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which had been unable to allocate a sufficient national budget for naval modernization 
aimed at countering hypothetical external military threats; the navy's policing role 
instead provided it with lucrative opportunities to supplement its budget. Thus, it 
should be noted that UNCLOS effectively provided a new rationale and momentum 
for the navy to strengthen its maritime authority by asserting the need for bolstering 
Indonesia's maritime security capacity to meet "international demands." By invoking 
the responsibilities "imposed" under the auspices of UNCLOS, the navy created a 
security raison d'etre that had not existed in terms of a credible external threat. In the 
case of the army, it could more easily instrumentalize threats from within and without 
in order to justify its paramount political and security roles. The navy faced a different 
situation, as its role in maritime security involved international concerns and 
monitoring, providing it with a trump card in institutional haggling and turf wars.
Operasi Kamla served as an important ritual to assert naval ascendancy over other 
maritime agencies. The periodic patrols of Operasi Kamla were under the command of 
the Western Fleet Command (Armada RI Kawasan Barat, or Armabar) in Jakarta and 
the Eastern Fleet Command (Armada RI Kawasan Timur, or Armatim) in Surabaya.17 
They were supported by civilian institutions linked with Bakorkamla. The patrols 
promoted the image of Operasi Kamla by making some high-profile arrests and 
impounding some illegal fishing boats and vessels smuggling goods and people 
during the periodic operations every year.18 Regardless of the successes and failures of 
Operasi Kamla, in the context of navy politics under the New Order, these 
institutionalized operations at sea helped sustain militarized management of maritime 
affairs for more than three decades following the West Irian campaign. Thus, it is clear 
that dwifungsi, UNCLOS, and Operasi Kamla were three major factors enabling the 
navy to extend and maintain its power during the Suharto era.
Post-Suharto Challenges to the Navy
The End of Dwifungsi
How did the collapse of the New Order regime influence the navy? It appears that 
the end of dwifungsi undermined the navy's role in maritime security. In fact, there 
were several significant developments that pressured the navy to adapt to the new 
environment. First, soon after the fall of Suharto, powerful political demands to 
democratize the authoritarian polity forced the military to embrace reforms aimed at 
attenuating its political role and influence. The military lost its New Order-sanctioned 
political hegemony, and the legitimacy of dwifungsi was no longer sacrosanct or a 
compelling justification for a pervasive military role in politics. In response, the 
military introduced several reforms under the slogan "new paradigm" (paradigma baru) 
in September 1998. The new paradigm's reform projects brought about visible
17 The navy implemented reorganization in 1985, replacing old territorial commands with two operational 
commands—Western Fleet and Eastern Fleet Armadas.
18 For details of Operasi Kamla in the 1980s and 1990s, see Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, Sejarah TNI Jilid 
V (1984—2000) (fakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, 2000), pp. 52-62.
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changes.19 The military eliminated its sociopolitical section—which had overseen 
everyday political intervention—from its organizational structure. In addition, it was 
declared that military officers would no longer side automatically with Golkar, a 
government party under the New Order, and that the military would refrain from 
interfering with or supporting political parties during electoral campaigns. Moreover, 
the number of military representatives in the parliament, or DPR (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly), was reduced from seventy-five to thirty- 
eight. The military also decided to stop the practice of dispatching active officers to 
civilian bureaucratic posts. This last development—which affected all services within 
the military—led to the withdrawal of uniformed navy personnel from other maritime 
agencies, and it contributed to the process of civilianizing and demilitarizing 
Indonesia's maritime administration.
Second, as a result of the new paradigm reforms, the police became independent 
from the military. Thus, in terms of institutional organization, in April 1999 the 
military returned to the pre-Suharto structure of three service branches—army, navy, 
and air force—and renamed itself Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). This functional 
separation was inevitably accompanied by the redefinition of responsibilities between 
the police and the TNI, a process fraught with conflict and turf battles. The TNI was 
assigned responsibility for national "defense," and the police was given the role of 
maintaining domestic "security" and "order."20 Political elites in the parliament and 
civil society in general expected that the new division of responsibilities would lead 
the military to professionalize its capacities regarding external defense matters. As a 
result of this reform, however, there was growing dissatisfaction among TNI officers, 
who found promotions more difficult to secure given the reduced posts within the 
military and the shifting of domestic security functions to the police, an organization 
that enjoyed far less capacity, influence, and status relative to TNI. In addition, many 
lucrative side businesses involving protection faced intensified competition.21 
Resulting frustrations fanned TNI personnel's distrust and resentment against the 
police. In the context of naval dominance of maritime administration, the enhanced 
role of the police in domestic security and order indicated a more powerful role for 
Polair in dealing with coastal "security" issues. That growing rivalry between the navy 
and water police over the division of authority and responsibility for maritime security 
has significantly undermined the function of Bakorkamla and led to confusion in post- 
Suharto maritime administration.
19 About post-Suharto military reform, see, for example, Marcus Mietzner, The Politics o f Military Reform in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies 23 (Washington, 
DC: East-West Center Washington, 2006).
20 The legal basis for this functional separation was prepared in 2000 when parliamentarians passed two 
decrees in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly), the country's 
highest decision-making body. The two MPR decrees are (1) Ketetapan MPR No. VI/ 2000 Tentang 
Pemisahan Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia and (2) Ketetapan 
MPR No. VII/ 2000 Tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia.
21 Turf battles for illicit income-generating jobs frequently escalated to armed clashes between the army 
and the police. For a discussion of such events, see The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military 
Elite," Indonesia 80 (October 2005): 123-59.
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Redefining Mission
In coping with those new developments, the navy initially attempted to reassert 
itself to maintain its turf in maritime security. This took place under the leadership of 
Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto, Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Admiral Slamet 
Soebijanto, Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono, and Vice Admiral Tedjo Edhy 
Purdijanto.22 As we will see below, these officers developed the navy's strategies for 
survival in the age of democracy. Soon after the rivalry with Polair became 
institutionalized in 1999, naval headquarter's leaders expressed their new vision for 
strengthening the navy's role and presence in maritime administration. In its mission 
statement entitled "The Posture of Naval Power toward Twenty-First Century,"23 
delivered at the 1999 TNI seminar, navy leadership stressed that the international 
community, as notably seen in the stance of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), expected Indonesia to improve security and safety in Indonesian waters. The 
navy officers further argued that a failure to do so would provide foreign governments 
a pretext—that of protecting their vessels and crews—to intervene in the sovereign 
territory of Indonesia.24 To avoid infringements on Indonesian sovereignty, and to 
meet the security demands of the international community, the navy called for an 
overhaul of its defense system by establishing Regional Maritime Commands 
(Komando Daerah Maritim, Kodamar) that would serve as bases for the navy's regular 
patrolling of Indonesian territorial waters.25 This proposal to establish a territorial 
defense system, resembling the army structure of Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer, or 
Regional Military Commands), constituted an initial vision of the post-Suharto navy 
aimed at securing its institutional ascendancy over other maritime agencies.
The greatest obstacle blocking the navy's agenda, however, was the budgetary 
constraints affecting the government amidst the economic crisis. During the presidency 
of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), the TNI had its first commander-in-chief from the 
navy—Admiral Widodo—and the agenda of strengthening and modernizing the navy 
was emphasized within the TNI, as part of overall military reform to review the 
tradition of army-centric defense planning and to develop the strategic significance of 
Wawasan Nusantara, or the Archipelagic Concept, put forth by the navy. Nevertheless, 
the Widodo leadership soon realized that the government's financial woes not only 
blocked costly modernization projects and organizational restructuring, but also
22 Widodo was the first TNI commander with a navy background. He held the post from November 1999 
to June 2002. Sondakh, as TNI's inspector general, served under Widodo and was later promoted to navy 
chief-of-staff (May 2002-February 2005). Soebijanto also served Widodo, as deputy assistant for general 
planning to the TNI commander, and later replaced Sondakh as the navy chief-of-staff, leading the 
organization until October 2007. As Soebijanto's successor as deputy assistant for general planning, 
Sumaryono also served under Widodo. During Sondakh's navy leadership, Sumaryono was entrusted to 
be Western Fleet commander and was later promoted to chief executive of Bakorkamla. Purdijanto served 
as Western Fleet commander under Soebijanto's navy leadership and in 2008 became navy chief-of-staff.
23 Markas Besar Angkatan Laut Tentara Nasional Indonesia, "Postur Kekuatan TNI AL Menyongsong 
Abad 21," paper prepared for TNI Seminar, Bandung, May 12,1999.
24 Ibid., p. 9.
25 The navy suggested establishing nine Kodamars throughout the archipelago: Kodamar I/Belawan; 
Kodamar II/Tanjung Pinang; Kodamar III / Teluk Ratai; Kodamar IV/ Surabaya; Kodamar V/ Banjarmasin; 
Kodamar Vl/Ujung Pandang; Kodamar VII/Manado; Kodamar VIII/Ambon; and Kodamar IX/Jayapura. 
See ibid., pp. 24-26.
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hindered basic fleet maintenance.26 As a result, the navy had no choice but to shrink its 
defense activities, reforming its patrol style into the "waiting system," in which naval 
operations were conducted only "on demand."27 In 2002, under the leadership of navy 
chief-of-staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, the navy was finally forced to revise its 
defense outlook to meet the reality of funding constraints. Sondakh produced a new 
ten-year development plan for the navy, entitled Cetak Biru TNI-AL 2013, or Navy 
Blueprint for 2013. The blueprint insisted that the justification for naval modernization 
was not based on any new threat, but rather was urgently needed because the navy's 
fleet was antiquated and dilapidated.28 Thus, the blueprint argued, naval 
modernization was imperative and critical to both national security and 
professionalism. The navy called for an increase in the number of naval ships from the 
current 113 to 190 by 2013, claiming that 190 ships were needed to meet the ideal level 
of national defense in Asia's largest archipelagic country. However, recognizing the 
difficulty of securing a sufficient budget, the navy also provided two additional 
options, one suggesting that 170 ships would enable it to provide an adequate level of 
naval defense, while 138 vessels would be the minimum requirement for the navy to 
carry out its basic duties.29 30With those plans on the table, the navy gradually asserted 
its long-term goal for 190 ships to establish a "green-water navy" by 2020. According to 
Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, Sondakh's successor as navy chief-of-staff, the newly 
defined green-water navy represented a level of sea power higher than that of a 
brown-water (coastal) navy, but below that of a fully operational, go-anywhere blue-
30water navy.
These developments all illustrate how the post-Suharto navy asserted its interests 
in responding to the initial period of reformasi. Confronted with the end of dwijungsi 
and the rise of Polair, which significantly undermined the navy's dominance, the navy 
leadership first tried to regain influence by establishing a territorial command presence 
throughout the archipelago with a Kodamar structure. However, due to the 
government's financial woes, the navy had to scale back its ambitions and adopt the 
"on demand" patrol system. Responding to this setback, the navy promoted its need 
for modernization with the blueprint initiative, and redefined its mission as a green- 
water navy. The official abandonment of a blue-water capability carried implications 
for the rivalry between the navy and Polair, intensifying the turf battle over their 
overlapping jurisdictions. Despite the navy's new assertiveness, it faced difficulties in 
recovering ascendancy in maritime security governance, if only because of the fact that 
most of its fleet was not operational. In addition, the changing regional maritime 
security environment bolstered the significance of nonmilitary responses, as discussed 
below.
26 During a DPR hearing in February 2008, the navy chief-of-staff, Admiral Sumardjono, revealed that out 
of 143 warships, only eleven were operational. See Abdul Khalik, "Blame Game Erupts on Aging 
Weapons," The Jakarta Post, February 8, 2008.
27 "The Western Fleet Naval Aviation: Flying for 4 Billion Dollars," Angkasa 7 (April 2000).
28 See "TNI AL Buat Cetak Biru: Pembangunan Kekuatan Sampai 2013," Media Indonesia, October 7, 2003; 
and Alman Flelvas Ali, "Cetak Biru TNI AL 2013," Sinar Harapan, December 4, 2004.
29 "Perlengkapan Senjata TNI AL Baru Terpenuhi Tahun 2013," Sinar Harapan, November 27, 2004. The 
navy successfully increased the number of warships to 138 as of 2008.
30 Cited by Riefqi Muna in "Indonesia Aims for 'Green Water Navy' Capability," Jane's Defence Weekly, 
June 29, 2005.
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Nonmilitary Issues in Maritime Security
Indonesia has been facing new challenges in maritime security since the economic 
crisis in 1997. The economic crisis, which led to the fall of Suharto, proved a boon to 
the underworld economy, most notably for the businesses of illegal logging and 
fishing, human trafficking, illicit-drug trading, and armed robbery (or piracy) at sea. 
These transnational crimes quickly became major concerns for the government as they 
posed serious threats to both the national economy and human security.31 For example, 
timber exports to the US, EU, Japan, and China increased almost tenfold since 1997, but 
smuggling and illegal logging cost Indonesia an estimated US$4 billion in revenues 
annually, approximately five times the yearly budget for the Ministry of Health.32 
Illegal fishing has also increased and caused between US$2 and $3 billion annually in 
state losses.33 Regarding human trafficking, an estimated 100,000 Indonesian women 
and children are trafficked every year, according to UNICEF, but the police handle less 
than 200 cases annually.34 The abrupt increase of the illicit-drug trade also posed a 
national threat, as the national narcotics agency (Badan Narkotika Nasional, BNN) 
estimated that the country's drug trade was worth almost US$4 billion a year, and that 
as many as four million people used illegal drugs.35 Violence at sea has also become 
more conspicuous after 1997, as reflected in the number of piracy incidents and armed 
robberies in Indonesian waters—from 47 in 1997 to 119 in 2000—and in the Straits of 
Malacca, from zero in 1997 to 75 in 2000.36 These developments all show that the 
economic crisis and political confusion in 1997-98 contributed to the expansion of the 
underground economy led by cross-border criminal networks.
Since criminal rings were notably active in Indonesian waters, the international 
community strongly pressured the government to strengthen its law enforcement 
capacity to combat transnational crime. Donor countries, such as the US, Australia, and 
Japan, as well as ASEAN countries, all made commitments to promote regional and 
bilateral cooperation to fight cross-border organized crime. It is in this arena that the 
role of the navy as a stakeholder in maritime security has been neutralized vis-a-vis 
"civilian" law enforcement agencies that can institutionally promote closer cooperation
31 For the development of transnational crime since 1997, see Jun Honna, "Transnational Crime and 
Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia," Protecting Human Security in a Post-9/11 World: Critical and Global 
Insights, ed. Giorgio Shani, et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 97-114.
32 See Bambang Setiono and Yunus Husein, "Fighting Forest Crime and Promoting Prudent Banking for 
Sustainable Forest Management: The Anti-Money Laundering Approach," CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 
44 (Bogor: Center for International Forest Research, 2005), p. 4; and the EIA/Telapak report, The Thousand- 
Headed Snake: Forest Crimes, Corruption, and Injustice in Indonesia (London: Environmental Investigation 
Agency, March 2007), p. 3.
33 See "RI Forms New Courts to Fight Illegal Fishing," The Jakarta Post, October 18, 2007; and Brian Fegan, 
"Plundering the Sea: Regulating Trawling Companies is Difficult When the Navy is in Business with 
them," Inside Indonesia (January-March 2003).
34 UNICEF, "Children Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of Reach," press release, Jakarta, January 12, 2006, p. 
4; Penghapusan Perdagangan Orang (Trafficking in Persons) di Indonesia Tahun 2004-2005 (Jakarta: 
Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, 2005), p. 19.
35 "Empat Juta Penduduk Indonesia Pencandu Narkoba," Sinar Harapan, June 7, 2006.
36 ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 
January-31 December 2005," January 31, 2006, p. 5.
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with other countries and operate in a manner less threatening than that of the 
military.37
Clearly the navy faced several obstacles in promoting international cooperation 
against transnational crime. First, the navy has been the subject of a US ban on military 
aid since 1999.38 This sanction effectively helped police agencies, rather than the navy, 
gain US assistance in developing capacity to deal with maritime security related to 
terrorism and crime. Without US cooperation, the navy was left behind Polair, which 
enjoyed various offers of grants, including the provision of patrol vessels and training, 
under the US International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP).
Second, it has gradually become common practice for the regional security 
community to build up civilian coast guard agencies both to deal professionally with 
maritime crime in the sovereign territory and to promote regional cooperation.39 
Combating crime at sea mostly depends on an organization's ability to police the seas 
with speedy patrol boats, but these are not professionally associated with the navy, an 
institution that is geared toward "killing the enemy—rather than capturing evidence— 
and eager to have large-scale naval vessels with high-tech war abilities."40 The navy's 
warships are not suitable for handling transnational crime; instead, smaller, speedier 
patrol boats are most appropriate for the mission and cost far less to purchase, run, and 
maintain. In recognition of the rising threat of crime at sea, the Philippines established 
its coast guard (PCG) in 1998 and Malaysia established the Malaysia Maritime 
Enforcement Agency, or MMEA, in 2004. As noted above, Indonesia has KPLP under 
the Directorate of Maritime Transportation in the Department of Transportation. KPLP 
is a civilian organization in charge of patrolling maritime waters, but it is not granted 
judicial authority by the national law regarding maritime law enforcement. Thus, the 
role and authority of KPLP have long been limited to technical matters related to the 
Department of Transportation. It is against this backdrop that both the Philippines and 
Malaysia have expected Indonesia—the biggest maritime state in Southeast Asia—to 
follow their lead in establishing an effective coast guard and play a more active role in 
promoting regional cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies.41 Clearly, 
the navy found itself out of the loop in the region's newly emerging maritime strategic 
environment.
This trend has been significantly accelerated by international pressure orchestrated 
by the US in the wake of 9/11. The US strongly pressured the international 
community, in the name of a global "war on terrorism," to review the existing ISPS 
(International Ship and Port Facility Security) Code, resulting in the adoption of an 
amended version by the IMO in December 2002, and its implementation in July 2004.
37 This view was emphasized during my July 2007 interviews with police officers, both in the 
Transnational Crime Center (TNCC) of the National Police and in the narcotics agency, BNN.
38 The ban was to protest human rights abuses by TNI in East Timor. This ban was mostly lifted in 2005 
under the G. W. Bush administration, which saw Indonesia as a partner in its "war against terrorism."
39 About this trend, see Sam Bateman, "Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security," Asia 
Pacific Issues 65 (January 2003).
40 Interview with Captain Joel S. Garcia, Communications and Information System Command, Philippine 
Coast Guard, August 15, 2007.
41 Interviews with Vice Admiral Danilo A. Abinoja, Deputy Commandant for Operations, PCG (August 
13, 2007) and Rear Admiral Dato' Noor Aziz Yunan, Deputy Director General of MMEA (August 17, 2007).
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The amended ISPS Code had two key revisions: (1) all countries that signed the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)—including Indonesia— 
are obliged to provide appropriate security measures in their ports, and (2) those 
countries are allowed formally to exercise control over foreign ships in their territorial 
waters, including the denial of port entry. Those revisions came as a big shock for the 
Indonesian shipping industry, since the country's maritime waters were identified by 
the international community as a "black spot," or dangerous zone,42 and therefore 
ships from Indonesia to the US could be stopped and denied access in accordance with 
the amended ISPS Code.43 For Indonesia's maritime industry, it became apparent that 
Indonesia's weak governance at sea could prove a huge economic liability. The 
improvement of port security soon became a major concern for the government in 
dealing with the new security regime at sea, but the agenda of strengthening law 
enforcement in the ports was not a navy matter. Again, the navy was left bobbing in 
the wake of new developments in maritime security.
Having assessed the changing strategic environment in the age of transnational 
crime, and the limited ability of the navy to deal with it, the Yudhoyono government 
issued a presidential decree in 2005 to transfer Bakorkamla's authority from the 
military headquarters to the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security 
Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam). The new Bakorkamla is charged with formulating 
national maritime policy and coordinating the activities of twelve maritime-related 
institutions, including the navy, Polair, and KPLP. Bakorkamla does not have any 
operational capacity, so that actual law-enforcement activities are conducted by other 
agencies, but this is the first attempt at reorganizing the roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders in maritime governance in post-Suharto Indonesia. Despite considerable 
domestic skepticism that the new Bakorkamla will enhance maritime security 
management, this reorganization is largely welcomed by the international community. 
Overseas, in the IMO in particular, there is concern about Indonesia's unclear structure 
of authority in the maritime sector involving various agencies without efficient 
coordination.44 Drawing on this international support in its domestic turf battles, 
Bakorkamla is establishing its presence, according to its chief executive, Vice Admiral 
Djoko Sumaryono.45 Bakorkamla primarily serves as a forum for political battles 
among stakeholders in maritime security, notably the navy, police, and KPLP, which 
are conscious and wary about losing jurisdiction, authority, and politico-economic 
interests associated with maritime governance.
Since maritime issues are not directly related to the army, a symbol of the 
authoritarian past, the media has paid little attention to this security-sector turf battle. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of a rejuvenated Bakorkamla has significant implications 
for navy politics. When the idea of a new Bakorkamla first emerged in 2004, it was the 
navy that expressed the strongest resistance, fearing the possible loss of maritime
42 See, for example, "Indonesia Piracy Black Spot as Attacks Rise," Lloyd's List, November 7, 2000, p. 18.
43 About the ISPS Code concerns, see Hengky Supit, Teropong Kajian Lata Kelautan Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Pendidikan Maritim Indonesia, 2004), pp. 13-14.
44 IMO produced a report of recommendations to the Indonesian government in November 2002, which 
emphasized the need for clarifying the roles of the overlapping maritime authorities. For the IMO 
recommendations, see ibid., pp. 14—18.
45 Interview with Vice Admiral Djoko Sumaryono, chief executive of Bakorkamla, August 22, 2007.
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authority it had enjoyed since the Sukarno era. Significantly, however, the navy 
quickly recognized that its resistance would not change the situation, given that— 
unlike the army—it had no strong political resources to shape the direction of 
government discourse. The navy—whose past involvement in dwifungsi was limited— 
had less experience in political bargaining and manipulation compared to the army, 
and considerably less clout. Thus, it is understandable that the navy chose to adapt 
itself to the new environment rather than alter or challenge the government decision. 
How to take the initiative in developing Bakorkamla soon dominated the agenda in the 
navy's top circles. Naval leaders found an answer in proposing the establishment of 
the Sea and Coast Guard of Indonesia (SCGI).
Civilianizing the Navy, Militarizing the Coast Guard?
In formulating the idea of SCGI, the role of the business sector was significant. 
Indonesia's Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri 
Indonesia, KADIN) was concerned about the new ISPS Code and the worsening 
security and safety of Indonesia's territorial waters resulting from the growing number 
of armed robberies and other transnational crimes at sea. Maritime insecurity led to 
dramatic hikes in insurance fees for the maritime industry and otherwise damaged the 
country's shipping businesses.46 KADIN lobbied the navy to address this problem by 
strengthening its capacity to maintain maritime security and ensure the safety of 
merchant ships operating in Indonesian waters. This led to the navy and KADIN 
reaching an official agreement regarding maritime security and administration in 
February 2006.47 Accordingly, the navy developed a security paradigm based on patrol 
boats, not warships, in dealing with maritime crime. The business sector seems to have 
played a significant role in promoting a perception that "national security" in the age 
of a global economy is no longer a monopoly of the military. By weighing in with 
economic concerns, KADIN drew on its expertise and influence and in doing so threw 
a lifeline to the navy, an institution that was trying to adapt to a rapidly shifting 
political and institutional environment. The navy astutely asserted and expanded its 
institutional interest by mobilizing this powerful "external" actor, KADIN, in security 
affairs, gaining crucial political backing. In December 2006, the navy headquarters, 
under the leadership of Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, submitted to the president its 
initial plan to establish SCGI as Indonesia's "main" organization to deal with maritime 
crime and to promote regional maritime security cooperation.48
"It is difficult for the navy to fully respond to the changing demands of maritime 
security, therefore we encourage Bakorkamla to take further steps to build SCGI and 
streamline the inefficient structure of maritime authority today," according to Vice
46 Interview with Oentoro Surya, chairman of the Indonesian National Shipowners' Association, August 
29, 2006.
47 The official document is "Piagam Kesepakatan Bersama antara Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia 
dengan Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut tentang Pembangunan Ekonomi Maritim dan 
Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Maritim," Nomor: PKB/ 2 /I I /2006.
48 The official document is Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, "Pendirian Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia 
(SCGI) Sebagai Upaya Penajaman Fungsi Penegakan Keamanan di Laut," Jakarta, December 2006.
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Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto.49 In the eyes of navy elites, Bakorkamla, the role of 
which is still limited to the coordination of inter-agency activities, is not sufficient to 
restructure Indonesia's maritime governance. According to the navy proposal, many 
democratic countries have professional civilian paramilitary organizations called coast 
guards that are responsible for maritime law enforcement. Also, according to the 
proposal, responsibility for Indonesia's coast guard function is unclear because 
overlapping authority and legal responsibilities are spread across twelve institutions, 
as already discussed. To meet global expectations, the proposal argues, it is time to 
streamline maritime authority and establish a unified representative in the global 
community of coast guards.50 The navy insists that the new coast guard, or SCGI, 
should be given a clear legal status as the maritime law-enforcement agency—a status 
that is not currently given to KPLP. The new coast guard is to be staffed by former 
KPLP members and navy officers. The navy also proposes that the SCGI should be 
placed under the department of transportation in order to comply with international 
standards, and it suggests that SCGI should have the following primary roles: 
maritime law enforcement, customs, aid to navigation (ATON) and shipping safety, 
fishery protection, search and rescue (SAR) at sea, and assistance to the navy in times 
of war, such as with port security and coastal patrols. With this new organization, the 
navy is proposing to eliminate the overlapping functions of other related agencies, 
including the navy itself. In this way, the navy, which was originally very reluctant to 
reorganize maritime security management, has actually become a prime mover of 
reform.
What were the calculations behind this shifting attitude? There is no doubt that the 
navy has been influenced by KADIN's economic concerns related to maritime security, 
and by international demands to promote law-enforcement cooperation at sea under 
the new regime of the amended ISPS Code. However, in the process of responding to 
these pressures, the navy seems to have found more compelling reasons to sell the idea 
of establishing SCGI. First, the new organization can absorb some of the officers in the 
top-heavy navy. "The navy will be more professional if SCGI is established and staffed 
with our friends," according to a navy officer.51 It is expected that the transfer of high 
level officers to SCGI may encourage promotion of younger generation officers within 
the navy.52 In addition, if SCGI recruits personnel from the navy—as do the coast 
guards of the Philippines and Malaysia—it may contribute to confidence-building 
between the two institutions and nurture respect for each others' jurisdictions. In the 
cases of the Philippines and Malaysia, many naval officers wished to move to the new
49 Interview with Vice Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto, director-general of defense planning, at the 
Defense Ministry, August 24, 2007. Purdijanto was promoted to TNI's chief of the general staff (Kasum) in 
December 2007 and to the navy chief-of-staff in June 2008. The promotion helped him to have more 
influence within the TNI in disseminating the idea of SCGI.
50 Markas Besar Angkatan Laut, "Pendirian Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (SCGI) Sebagai Upaya 
Penajaman Fungsi Penegakan Keamanan di Laut," p. 11.
51 Interview with Col. Desi A. Mamahit, assistant for operations to the Western Fleet Commander of the 
Indonesian Navy, December 16, 2007.
52 Since 2004, the pace of generational change within the TNI has slowed, mainly due to the fact that 
retirement age was extended from fifty-five to fifty-eight, as regulated in the armed forces law (Law No. 
34/ 2004), which made it possible for the older generation officers to hold onto their posts. On the broader 
impact on TNI, see The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, September 2005-March 
2008," Indonesia 85 (April 2008): 79-122.
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agencies, motivated by higher salaries and the relatively "clean" image of the new 
organizations.
Second, emphasizing the global trend of international coast guard cooperation is a 
very effective way for the navy to neutralize the role of the police in maritime security. 
With the creation of SCGI, the navy expects donor countries to provide both financial 
and technical assistance to develop SCGI's capacity, which, in turn, may help constrain 
the ascendancy of the police in security sector governance. If a significant number of 
SCGI personnel is drawn from among former navy officers, and Polair is sidelined in 
maritime security, TNI's institutional interests would benefit in its rivalry with the 
police. However, the prospects for establishing SCGI are uncertain pending final 
approval by the president. "The police, which are the most corrupt institution in the 
country, may try to derail the plan by providing negative input to the president. But 
we are optimistic about the wisdom of SBY [President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono]," 
claimed retired navy officers involved in the SCGI planning.53 However, the police 
agency is directly responsible to the president, while the navy needs to go through the 
channel of TNI headquarters to lobby the president. It can be anticipated that the police 
will challenge the SCGI proposal by highlighting the cost of establishing a new 
organization and the merit of preserving the "independent" KPLP. The police may also 
lobby parliamentarians against the SCGI bill, while the navy will conduct its own 
lobbying, drawing on TNI networks. In this sense, the political dogfight between the 
navy and police will probably escalate in the coming years.
Conclusion
The navy is navigating the uncharted waters of reformasi in the post-Suharto era, 
trying to respond to domestic demands for military reform and international pressures 
to improve maritime security while maintaining its institutional interests. The police 
have successfully encroached on the previously unchallenged authority of the navy 
over maritime affairs, drawing on domestic support for reorienting the military to 
focus on national defense and international support for improved policing aimed at 
curtailing crimes at sea. The navy tried to counter Polair's emergence by calling for a 
modernization of the navy and asserting the need for a green-water capability, one that 
would combine coastal and sea security duties. However, it is apparent that Polair 
retains the initiative, and naval modernization is not an effective strategy for regaining 
the high ground in maritime security. By invoking international pressures and 
enlisting powerful domestic actors, however, the navy may have found its trump card 
in the security sector turf battles. By mobilizing KADIN support for its proposal to 
establish a coast guard (SCGI), and by justifying this as a response to international 
expectations and norms in maritime security, the navy may manage to snatch victory 
from the jaws of defeat. This strategy for protecting the navy's institutional interests 
benefits from being couched in terms of protecting national economic interests, i.e., the 
KADIN angle, and has the appearance of being an altruistic proposal in that the navy 
cedes some of its existing authority to the SCGI and accords it a central role in 
maritime security. The major benefit of doing so is to ensure that the police and Polair 
also cede their authority in maritime affairs. The navy is confident that it will retain
53 Interviews with Captain (ret.) Henky Lumenta and Captain (ret.) Henky Supit, December 18, 2007.
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significant influence in SCGI because many of its officers would be natural recruits to 
the coast guard and such transfers carry the added benefit of solving its promotion 
logjam, a problem caused by the postponement of the retirement age from fifty-five to 
fifty-eight. In this sense, the navy hopes to shape the SCGI into a "second navy." When 
making this argument, the navy points to Malaysia and the Philippines, where coast 
guards were established recently with significant assistance from the respective navies, 
especially in terms of human resources. Here we see how the navy attempts to 
mobilize what it calls international pressures, global norms, and regional standards, 
and transform them into a breakthrough strategy in its realpolitik battle with the police.
Instrumentalizing external pressures provides the navy with a powerful weapon in 
asserting its role in the changing regional maritime security environment, where 
terrorism and the growing threat of transnational crime at sea are the main threats, 
unlike during the Cold War. Paradoxically, the emergence of "nonmilitary" security 
issues has opened a window of opportunity for the navy to regain influence in 
maritime governance. The SCGI proposal is not yet approved, but, given the vigorous 
lobbying of TNI, KADIN, and skillful deployment of "international pressures and 
expectations," it is very likely that Yudhoyono will endorse the plan by the end of his 
presidential term in 2009. Then there will be a new stage in the turf battle between the 
Polair-police and SCGI-navy coalitions.
In comparison with the army's response to an independent police in the post- 
Suharto era, the turf battles of the navy attract little public attention. It is a quiet battle, 
as compared with the attention given to the army. The army has taken the lead in 
defending military interests by asserting that the police are incapable of handling 
domestic security on their own. The army leadership points to the enduring communal 
conflicts in various parts of the country as justification for the army to remain involved 
in domestic security affairs. Significantly, the army's territorial commands give it 
extensive and autonomous power to manipulate security conditions in the archipelago, 
endowing it with the ability to stir up trouble in order to convince the public that the 
police are not up to the task. Unlike the army, the navy does not have sufficient 
autonomy or power to manipulate security at sea; rather, what is most obvious is its 
insufficient capacity to control Indonesian territorial waters. Against this backdrop, the 
navy is more reliant on the international angle in protecting its turf and has had to be 
more flexible in redefining its mission and trying to protect its interests by promoting 
the establishment of a competing institution, the coast guard, as a last ditch attempt to 
counter the rise of Polair in maritime security.
The scholarly debate on the TNI in the age of reformasi has largely neglected the 
development of non-army services since they are not considered to be main players in 
national politics. As we have seen in the case of the navy, however, the non-army 
services also have their own vested interests to protect and have developed strategies 
to survive in the era of democracy. In this regard, further studies on the non-army 
services will provide us with more comprehensive insights into the problems facing 
the Indonesian military as it has adapted to democratic reforms implemented during 
reformasi. Since this article primarily attempts to address the newly emerging 
"institutional" rivalry between the navy and the police, as a case of non-army reform 
politics, my analytical scope is largely limited to the level of organization. 
Consequently, internal politics and personal power struggles within the navy are not
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discussed in detail. In the study of the Indonesian army, data for which has been 
accumulated since the 1950s, such an impersonal approach may not be acceptable. This 
is perhaps where the scholarly inquiry is further needed for developing the study of 
the military in democratizing Indonesia.
